Hear No Evil, See No Evil: On Professor Nesson\u27s Claims About Evidence Suppression by Nance, Dale A.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
1991 
Hear No Evil, See No Evil: On Professor Nesson's Claims About 
Evidence Suppression 
Dale A. Nance 
Case Western University School of Law, dale.nance@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Repository Citation 
Nance, Dale A., "Hear No Evil, See No Evil: On Professor Nesson's Claims About Evidence Suppression" 
(1991). Faculty Publications. 288. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/288 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
HEAR NO EVIL, SEE NO EVIL: A CO:rviMENT 
ON PROFESSOR NESSON'S CLAIMS ABOUT 
EVIDENCE SUPPRESSION 
Dale A. Nance* 
Charles Nessen's contribution to this symposium points to a po-
tentially serious problem in our system of civil litigation. Motivated 
by his unsettling experience in working on a major piece of litigation, 
Nesson levels a serious charge of judicial reluctance to respond to the 
suppression of adverse evidence by parties. 1 He argues that judges are 
insufficiently willing to employ the arsenal of available responses to 
suppression: "judges seem willing, even anxious, to ignore or mini-
mize the role of spoliation rather than to recognize and address it as a 
serious problem. " 2 
In order to illustrate his claim, Nesson takes us on a tour of the 
thinking of the amoral calculator, Holmes's "bad man," and illus-
trates how there are strong incentives to suppress. He argues that 
there is often a high probability that suppression will not be discov-
ered.3 He then guides us through the litigation process to show that 
even if the suppression is discovered, the consequences to the suppres-
sor are not serious enough to offset the discount resulting from the 
chance of not being discovered.4 In these claims, Nesson explicitly 
takes issue with many commentators who argue that, especially in the 
important case of embarrassing documents, the copy machine and the 
computer have made the effective suppression of evidence an extraor-
dinarily difficult and risky business. 5 
With regard to his first point, Nesson offers little by way of argu-
ment or evidence that his estimate of the likelihood of discovery is 
more accurate than that of the persons, both practitioners and aca-
• Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of 
Law; B.A., 1974, Rice University; J.D., 1977, Stanford University; M.A. (Jurisprudence and 
Social Policy), 1982, University of California, Berkeley. 
I Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need far Vigorous Judi-
cial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793 (1991). 
2 Jd. Nessen's preferred term is "spoliation," but he clarifies that this includes destruc-
tion as well as other modes of suppression. ld. Moreover, his discussion moves relatively 
freely, and sometimes confusingly, between issues of destruction and issues of withholding of 
evidence. I shall use the general term "suppression" to refer to either destruction or 
withholding. 
3 Jd. at 795-96. 
4 Jd. at 796-805. 
5 Jd. at 795. 
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demics, with whom he disagrees. Nesson is right, of course, that in a 
given situation the circumstances may point to a high probability that 
suppression will go undetected, but he gives us little reason to think 
that the incidence of these situations is great or even that it is great 
enough to warrant lawyers' and clients' adopting a flexible advice pol-
icy that incurs the expenses of investigation necessary to discern 
whether this is a "good" case to attempt suppression. 
Nesson's main argument in this regard is that most cases settle, 
leaving it very unlikely that suppression will be discovered thereafter 
because the lawyers lose interest in the case. 6 While it is not so obvi-
ous that clients lose interest, there is still reason to believe that the 
probability of detection drops off after settlement. 7 However, it is 
somewhat difficult to know what the implications of this difference 
are in terms of the strength of incentives. If the litigant knows in 
advance that a case will settle early, then suppression may be a rela-
tively preferred strategy for improving the terms of the anticipated 
settlement. If the litigant knows that the case will not settle, or wi11 
settle only late in the process, suppression would be relatively more 
likely to be detected. What this means for the general case when set-
tlement prospects can only be gauged in rough probabilistic tenns is 
unclear, except that suppression may be more likely in our system 
than one that does not allow out-of-court settlement at all. This is not 
terribly illuminating on the question of who is right-Nesson or those 
he contradicts-about the risk of detection in our system as it is. 8 
As to the anticipated consequences of detection, Nesson asserts a 
reluctance on the part of the judiciary to get involved in discovery 
disputes, as well as a nondeterrent character in those sanciions that 
the judiciary does impose. The former claim seems plausible enough 
to me, but the evidence he adduces is not particularly persuasive. For 
example, he claims that suppression, once discovered, predictably re-
sults only in judicial demand that the information in question be 
turned over to the opponent, there being no judicial motivation to 
pursue the matter of sanctions if this demand is satisfied.9 This may 
6 Jd. at 796. 
7 Settlement might result in a lowering of defensive guards to the revelation of damaging 
evidence as well as a reduction of incentives to investigate. Nesson does not address the 
former. 
8 Nesson notes that the claims of practitioners, though not reflecting "realistic risk assess-
ment," may "offer rhetorical support for ethical behavior." Jd. at 795. I take it this means 
that lawyers wanting to behave ethically may (knowingly or otherwise) exaggerate the risk of 
detection in order to convince their clients not to suppress evidence. Nesson does not address 
the virtue of such conduct, nor the effect of his critique, if widely accepted, upon such efforts of 
lawyers to control client dishonesty. 
9 !d. at 796. Nesson's view suggests that the optimal strategy for the bad-man litigant is 
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be right, in general, but Nesson offers no significant evidence to sup-
port the claim. The only example cited is a ruling in an antitrust case 
deferring decision on what sanctions to impose for plaintiff's willful 
suppression of evidence until after the jury reached its verdict, a rul-
ing made in part because the eviaence in question ultimately was 
made available to the opponent for potential use at trial. 10 This exam-
ple is rather misleading, however, since the court subsequently 
awarded a very large, clearly punitive sanction against the successfu] 
plaintiff, even though the prejudice from the suppression had been 
eliminated by the disclosure of the evidence. I I The case exemplifies 
just the opposite of judicial indifference once the evidence is 
produced. 12 
Similarly, one senses an element of truth in Nesson's argument 
that typical sanctions do not fully offset the discounting effect in the 
bad man's amora1 calculations. Again, however, there are reasons to 
doubt that J>Jesson's case is well established. Some qualifications fo-
cus on the appraisal of what the law is doing; others focus on the bad 
man's calculations given the prevailing pattern of juridical response. 
As to the former qualification, if one bases a conclusion about the 
severity of the law's response upon the reported results of individual 
sanction motions, as Nesson seems to do, then one risks underesti-
mating that severity, for the reported determination may not be the 
exclusive sanction meted out. As Nesson acknowledges early in his 
paper, there are many possible juridical responses to suppression. !3 
For example, the fact that a judge imposes a discovery sanction 
designed only to compensate the victim of suppression for expenses 
incurred in pursuing the evidence does not necessarily preclude the 
to 111ithhold, rather than to destroy, the offending evidence in anticipation of settlement, since 
the fanner would allow him to tum the infonnation over to his opponent if the suppression is 
detected. Destruction would leave the party open to the risk that settlement negotiations fail 
and, as trial approaches, the destruction is discovered, thereby incurring the ire of the trial 
judge for the litigant's self-imposed inability to reverse the suppression. 
10 Jd. at 797 n.20, citing Litton Sys. v. AT&T, 90 F.R.D. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Nesson 
cites several other cases in this context, but they all involve evidence destruction, where his 
proposition is not tested. Jd. at n.2l. 
II Litton Sys. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1983) (denial of costs and attorneys' 
fees to which plaintiff would otherwise be entitled by statute), a.ff'g 91 F.R.D. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981 ). The value of the sanction has been estimated at $25,000,000. Comment, Denial of 
Millions in Costs and Attorney's Fees as a Discovery Sanction, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 445, 453-54. 
12 Similarly, the case law that Nesson cites elsewhere as evidence of judicial reluctance to 
investigate claims of party complicity in the destruction of evidence by nonparty persons is not 
convincing, at least not without some further interpretation. The cases indicate tougher stan-
dards for sanctions than Nesson would apparently prefer, but they do not show that courts are 
unwilling to consider seriously such claims of complicity. Nesson, supra note I, at 799-800. 
I3 Jd. at 794. 1 elaborate on these responses, see Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 831 (1991). 
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later use at trial of an adverse inference argument by the opponent or 
an ancillary jury instruction, or the exclusion of derivative evidence 
offered by the suppressor, or even a subsequent action in tort. With-
out a comprehensive look at the litigation in question, it is hard to 
k..now whether the integrated response has an adequate deterrent ef-
fect. Perhaps Nesson has done the needed investigation of the full 
course of the litigations upon which he relies to illustrate his claim, 
but it is not obvious from his paper that he has. 14 · 
A similar point arises even if one looks to an isolated instance of 
juridical response. For example, Nesson relies heavily on the idea 
that those sanctions thought to be most severe, such as issue preclu-
sion, dismissal of a plaintiff, and default of a defendant, are not effec-
tive as deterrents. 15 His explanation is that the amoral calculator 
accurately perceives there is nothing to lose by suppressing. But this 
perception depends on the assumption, never exactly recognized by 
Nesson, that the evidence in question is perceived to be such that, if 
presented at trial, it would assure the opponent's victory on the issue 
upon which preclusion could be anticipated. That kind of evidence 
must be relatively rare, it seems to me. Much more commonly, an 
item of evidence, the suppression of which is contemplated, is such 
that its presentation at trial will significantly improve the opponent's 
chances of winning, but will not guarantee that result. An issue-
preclusive ruling in response to the suppression of such evidence may 
very well have a deterrent effect, depending upon the perceived likeli-
hood of detection. Thus, before we can conclude that the uses of the 
indicated sanctions have no deterrent effect, we need to do careful 
case studies of how they are employed and whether, in particular, 
they are all that is used in the context of suppression of the rare 
"linchpin" evidence. 16 
Important qualifications also arise from looking at the response 
of bad-man litigants to anticipated detection. In the first place, Nes-
son's illustrative calculations are presented as if the well-counseled 
litigant is not terribly risk averse. To the contrary, a discount for the 
probability of detection may be substantially offset by a strongly risk-
14 Nesson does not claim that lawyers, by failing in such investigation, are misled into 
wrongly underestimating the severity of sanctions. That may be true, but the remedy is not to 
be found in Nesson's argument. ironically, Nesson's argument may well convince the would-
be suppressor that the level of risk is acceptable. 
15 Nesson, supra note i, at 800-02. 
16 Unless the contents of the suppressed evidence are ultimately recovered, it is very diffi-
cult to know just how crucial it would have been to the other side. The cases cited by Nesson 
are evidence-destruction cases, where it is not clear what the destroyed evidence would have 
done for the opponent. See, e.g., id. at 801 n.53. 
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averse client or attorney. Clients vary too much to generalize safely, 
but I will hazard the suggestion that attorneys are, by education if not 
by general inclination, a relatively risk-averse lot. Moreover, there is 
little attention in Nesson's piece to the adverse consequences of de-
tected suppres-sion beyo11_d_the confines of the instant litigation, conse-
quences such as adverse publicity. He does consider briefly the issue 
of publicity for the bad-man lawyer's calculations, concluding that 
such a lawyer may view his reputation as a suppressor as not damag-
ing, perhaps even advantageous, in the eyes of potential clients. 17 But 
Nesson fails to recognize that the bad-man client will be more inter-
ested in similarly inclined lawyers who do not get caught. These fac-
tors need rather more attention before one can accurately gauge the 
extent to which incentives favor suppression, even from the point of 
view of the Holmesian bad man. 
Of course, I am not suggesting that evidence suppression is not a 
serious problem. Murder is a serious problem, even if systemic incen· 
tives do not strongly favor it as a general practice. Surprisingly, given 
Nesson's claims, my main reason for thinking that there is a serious 
problem of suppression is that the law does so much in trying to re-
spond to it. This fact certainly suggests that there are strong incen-
tives favoring suppression in the absence of such responses, but it 
leaves open the question of the adequacy or optimality of the prevail-
ing response structure. I should add that I suspect, along with Nes-
son, that the level of severity of juridical response is (still) 
substantially below the optimal as a general matter, but my suspicion 
stems more from the gradually accumulating empirical evidence of 
the prevalence of suppression than from the rather ambiguous conse-
quences of Nesson's theoretical analysis of the bad man's thinking. 18 
I am also 1ess willing than Nesson to place the responsibility for 
the situation solely upon the judiciary. I find it odd that Nesson, 
while maintaining that the problem is not with the rules, makes use of 
the limitations in the rules in illustrating the weakness of juridical 
response. The most obvious example is his claim that, if the suppres-
sor can avoid detection until after judgment, it will be difficult for the 
opponent to obtain redress because of the closure limitations, in par-
ticular the one-year limitation placed upon reopening the case under 
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 19 Nesson's claim 
certainly seems like a problem with the rules. Of course, one could 
argue that the judiciary has shown less than the usual ingenuity in 
17 fd_ at 804-05_ 
IB Nesson notes at least some of what can be called the empirical evidence. Jd. at 793. 
19 ld_ at 798. 
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circumventing an unwanted limitation, and indeed one can readily 
imagine plausible lines of argument to the effect that the strictures of 
Rule 60(b) apply only to relief that 'W_9~ld n~guire a new trial, and not 
to ancillary discovery sanctions, or to the effect that the one-year limi-
tation does not apply to relief based on active suppression of evi-
dence.20 But Nesson does not make such a claim, for he supposes, 
without citing any authority, that the one-year limitation is clearly 
applicable to the problem of late discovery of suppression and to all 
requests for relief based thereon other than a separate action in tort. 
Yet he makes no recommendation about changing the Rule. 
Less obvious examples can be derived from his descriptions, 
which read more as criticisms, of the evolving common law of sanc-
tions, including various requirements that victims show their preju-
dice and their suppressors' intent to manipulate the system, as well as 
the judiciary's tendency to confine sanctions to a compensatory func-
tion.21 Nesson claims that these features reflect a confiation of the 
compensatory and punitive rationales for sanctioning suppression. 22 
This claim, though not new, is probably correct insofar as it alleges a 
degree of continuing confusion in the lawY Again, however, it is a 
little hard to say that this is a problem of judicial motivation and not a 
problem of doctrine. One would like to know what Professor Nesson 
has to say about the reform of these practices, whether we call them 
doctrinal or not, but his paper is silent on the matter other than to 
suggest implicitly that they are in need of some reworking. Insofar as 
his point is that we should liberalize the conditions under which puni-
tive sanctions are imposed, as distinct from increasing the severity of 
those sanctions, I would suggest caution. Imposing special require-
ments on the use of such sanctions is an important message to be 
derived from the whole of criminal law, as well as from the develop-
ing law of punitive damages in civil cases.24 
Other major doctrinal problems are not addressed even implicitly 
20 The ambiguities of Rule 60(b) are well known, especially in regard to the applicability of 
the one-year limitation on reopening cases. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CiVIL PROCE-
DURE 675-81 (3d ed. 1985). 
21 Nesson, supra note I, at 798-803. 
22 Jd. at 799. 
23 See generally Solum & Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction 
of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085 (1987). 
24 Interestingly, one way in which the institution of substantive, punitive awards in .civil 
cases is changing in many jurisdictions is that the requirements for such awards are being 
tightened to reflect their quasi-criminal character. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 
1353 (Me. 1985) (rejecting claim that punitive award constitutes double jeopardy when it fol-
lows a criminal conviction arising out of same act; nevertheless requiring clear and convincing 
evidence of malice as basis for punitive award, and allowing evidence of criminal penalties 
already imposed to mitigate punitive award). 
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in Nesson's paper. For example, a severe limitation noted by previous 
commentators is that discovery sanctions authorized under the im-
portant Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and state 
counterparts, are premised on the violation oCari order compelling 
discovery. This presents rather serious problems when evidence is de-
stroyed prior to the entry of such an order. 25 Less thoroughly dis-
cussed in the literature is the fact that the detailed specification of 
alternative sanciions in Rule 3i(b) is noticeably weak in the category 
of punitive monetary sanctions.26 Although such sanctions are not 
precluded by the language of the rule, this statutory silence cannot 
help but affect judicial attitudes. There has also been an unfortunate 
history of constitutional limitations on the punitive response to litiga-
tion abuse, which no doubt has been in the background of judicial 
decisions under Rule 3 7 (b )_27 
For all my reservations, I should say that I find much of value in 
Nesson's piece. He has reminded us of, if not alerted us to, a serious 
problem. His synthesis of practices centering on the problem of sup-
pression provides much illumination for those who want to look at 
the big picture of civil litigation. It provides us with greater detail 
concerning the causal mechanisms at work in the suppression of evi-
dence. However, the qualifications I have adduced relate importantly 
to the prescriptive issue of what, if anything, to do about suppression. 
To summarize, there is reason to think that the problem may not be 
as acute as Nesson would have it, and that, to the extent it needs 
attention, the problem is much more attributable to doctrinal difficul-
ties than he apparently believes. 
25 J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 72-85 (1989). 
26 The only explicit mention of monetary sanctions is in the concluding paragraph of rule 
37(b), which refers to the payment of "reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused 
by the failure" to obey court-ordered discovery. FED. R. Clv. P. 37(b)(2). This sanction is 
unmistakably compensatory, though confusion persists. See, e.g., Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1985) (reversal of attorney fine and remand for rede-
tennination and justification of amount). 
27 See J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, supra note 25, at 130-34. 
